PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: OVERCOMING TEAGUE’S “WATERSHED”
EXCEPTION TO NON-RETROACTIVITY
*

Jennifer H. Berman

Imagine that law enforcement officials pull you over as part of a
routine traffic safety inspection and discover marijuana in the bed of
your truck. Police officers place you under arrest, and the State
charges you with felony marijuana trafficking, as well as several misdemeanors. Upon your arraignment, the court assigns an overburdened public defender to handle your case. Although you believe
you are innocent of all charges, the State offers you a favorable plea
deal that will limit your sentence exposure and ensure that your criminal record remains free of any felony convictions. Your attorney advises you to accept the plea deal, assuring you that by pleading guilty,
you will be released from prison after just a few months’ time, allowing you to return to your family and get on with your life. Rather
than risk a lengthy trial and appeals process, you accept the plea deal,
serve your time, and return to your family.
Now imagine that several years have passed, and life has returned
to normal. That is, until a United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement official knocks on your door. Although you have lived
in the United States for decades, have raised U.S.-citizen children,
and have served as a productive member of American society, the
immigration official informs you that you are being deported back to
your home country. Shocked and confused, you appear before an
immigration judge, who informs you that by pleading guilty to those
misdemeanors several years back, you placed yourself under the jurisdiction of the Board of Immigrations. You plead with the judge;
your job, your family, your entire life is here in the United States.
Had you known the conviction would render you deportable, you
would have gone to trial and vigorously contested your guilt, rather
than accepting a guilty plea for a crime you did not commit. Although the judge sympathizes with your plight, he tells you that there
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is nothing he can do. The minute you pled guilty, your fate was
sealed.
This scenario is all too familiar to Jose Padilla, who pled guilty to
several misdemeanor drug charges in 2001, after his court-appointed
attorney told him he “did not have to worry” about his plea affecting
his immigration status. Fortunately, through a series of direct appeals
and post-conviction proceedings, Padilla was able to challenge his
conviction all the way up to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Padilla’s case, holding that defense attorneys have an affirmative obligation to advise noncitizens about the deportation consequences of a
1
guilty plea. The Court’s holding in Padilla overruled decades of lower court precedent regarding noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment rights.
The new rule announced in Padilla seems to have “mark[ed] a major
2
upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” which stands to profoundly impact the overlap between immigration and constitutional criminal
procedure.
In recent years, Congress has significantly restricted its immigration laws and has steadily expanded the category of offenses that may
render a noncitizen deportable. Indeed, an increasing number of offenses will now render noncitizens “automatically deportable”
through expedited procedures intended to ensure that the deportation occurs as soon as the alien is released from prison after serving
the sentence imposed for an underlying conviction. Now, more than
ever, noncitizens need attorneys who will effectively explain these issues to them when discussing the implications of their strategic
choices during criminal proceedings. Unfortunately, many attorneys
have not kept up with the changing immigration laws, and many
noncitizens now face deportation as a result of their counsel’s ineffective guidance.
Thus, for many noncitizen detainees, the Padilla decision could
not have come at a better time. The Padilla decision has paved the
way for an influx of habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals seeking to vacate their convictions based on Padilla’s Sixth Amendment
standard. However, since this decision came down relatively recently,
the vast majority of habeas petitions based on Padilla’s holding have
sought to apply the Padilla standard retroactively to convictions that
became final before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.

1
2

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Unfortunately for habeas petitioners post-Padilla, the prevailing
federal retroactivity doctrine has effectively barred retroactive application of the vast majority of new rules announced by the Supreme
3
Court. In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court announced that new
rules of criminal procedure would not apply retroactively on collat4
eral review unless the rule fell under one of two narrow exceptions.
The first Teague exception permits retroactive application of new
procedural rules that place “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
5
to proscribe.” The second Teague exception applies to “watershed
6
rules of criminal procedure” —ones that are necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction, and “alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
7
fairness of a proceeding.” The Supreme Court has emphasized the
tremendously limited scope of Teague’s watershed exception, and has
stated that “it is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules
requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the
8
concept of ordered liberty.” As the Court has remarked, it is “unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to
emerge,” and to this date, the Supreme Court has yet to find a new
9
rule that falls within the second Teague exception.
Lower courts remain divided on the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity,
and in the past year, federal courts have struggled to define the scope
of Padilla and its application to habeas petitioners. For the most part,
federal courts applying the Teague analysis to Padilla have struggled
with the threshold issue of whether Padilla’s central holding laid
down a “new rule of criminal procedure,” or merely reinterpreted the
existing Sixth Amendment standard as applied to plea proceedings.
Some courts have applied Padilla’s principles retroactively on the
grounds that Padilla did not forge a new rule, but merely applied the
10
Strickland analysis to a new circumstance. Other courts have denied
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 310 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665
(2001)).
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (quoting O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,
157 (1997)).
Beard, 542 U.S. at 417 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993)).
See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding Padilla was
not a new rule because it only extended counsel’s obligation to advise the defendant of
immigration consequences of a guilty plea).
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retroactivity, finding that Padilla did, in fact, announce a new rule of
criminal procedure that would not apply to petitioners whose convic11
tions became final before Padilla was decided.
After a year of debate on this issue, the Supreme Court will set out
to answer the question of Padilla’s retroactivity this fall when it de12
cides Chaidez v. United States. In August 2011, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals denied relief on a habeas petitioner’s Padilla-based
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure that did not apply to the
petitioner’s conviction, which became final before Padilla was an13
nounced. The Seventh Circuit’s decision created a circuit split on
the issue, which is now ripe for Supreme Court review. The Supreme
Court’s forthcoming decision in Chaidez will settle once and for all
whether Padilla created a “new rule” that is subject to further Teague
analysis. However, because neither party in Chaidez has raised any
14
question regarding the applicability of Teague’s exceptions, this issue
15
will very likely remain an open question.
Although the Supreme Court is unlikely to rule on this question,
many lower federal courts considering Padilla’s retroactivity have confronted the Teague exceptions head-on. These lower courts have all
determined that Padilla’s rule does not fall within either of Teague’s
16
two narrow exceptions. However, in light of the forthcoming decision in Chaidez, this question warrants a closer look. In the certiorari
11

12
13
14

15

16

See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011) (ruling that
Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply retroactively because it does not fall
within either of the Teague exceptions); Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th
Cir. 2011), cert granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3608 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820) (holding that
Padilla announced a new rule which does not apply retroactively).
Chaidez v. United States, 80 U.S.L.W. 3608 (Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 11-820).
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 694.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Chaidez v. United States, No. 11-820 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2011) (“[S]ave exceptions not relevant here, a rule of criminal procedure that ‘breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government’ will
not be given retroactive effect on collateral review.” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 301 (1989))).
There are, however, two petitions for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court that
directly address the applicability of the second Teague exception to Padilla. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Figureo-Sanchez v. United States, No. 12-164 (U.S. July 27, 2012),
81 U.S.L.W. 3092; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mathur v. United States, No. 12-439
(U.S. Oct. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 4842975. Should the Court avoid answering this more direct question in Chaidez, it could choose to grant certiorari in either of these cases to decide the issue once and for all.
See, e.g., Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1159 (finding that Padilla “is not within either of the extremely narrow Teague exceptions to the retroactivity bar”); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686
(holding that “Padilla announced a new rule that does not fall within either of Teague’s
exceptions . . .”).
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documents filed in the Supreme Court, the parties in Chaidez argued
that the question of Padilla’s retroactivity was one of “exceptional importance” which “go[es] to the core of the legitimacy of criminal
17
convictions.” Amicus briefs in support of Chaidez’s petition for certiorari argued that Padilla’s scope is central to the “proper and fair
18
functioning of our justice system,” indicating that many, if not most
immigrants, when properly advised by counsel, would choose to vigorously defend themselves before a jury rather than face the automat19
ic immigration consequences of a guilty plea. The parties’ acknowledgements in Chaidez show just how important Padilla’s principles are
to the fairness of a criminal proceeding. Given the exceptional importance of Padilla’s principles, there is room to argue that, should
the Court find that Padilla announced a new rule, Padilla should fall
under the second Teague exception for bedrock rules of criminal
procedure.
The scholarly literature regarding Padilla’s scope likewise supports
this conclusion. Many scholars have hinted that Padilla’s decision will
have an immensely profound impact on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and could one day even be interpreted as a “deportation Gideon,” which would guarantee a right to legal counsel in deportation
hearings. One scholar has even remarked that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla marked a “watershed” in the Court’s approach to
20
regulating plea proceedings. These scholarly arguments lend support to the idea that Padilla truly represented a “bedrock” rule of
criminal procedure that should fall within Teague’s watershed exception.
This Comment will discuss the doctrinal underpinnings of
Teague’s retroactivity standard, and will analyze Teague’s application to
Padilla-based claims, arguing that Padilla might fall under Teague’s
watershed exception. Part I summarizes the Court’s pre-Padilla Sixth
Amendment precedent in the context of habeas petitioners’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Part II discusses the Supreme
Court’s decision in Padilla and delineates the ways in which Padilla
changed the existing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III out17
18
19

20

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16.
Brief for Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition
at 12, Chaidez, No. 11-820 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2012).
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Immigration Project
of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Immigrant Defense
Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Chaidez, No. 11820 (U.S. Jan. 30, 2012).
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating The Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor To Consumer
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011).
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lines the Court’s retroactivity doctrine—highlighting Teague’s watershed exception—and includes a survey of the federal courts and the
various approaches taken in applying the retroactivity doctrine to Padilla-based claims. Finally, in Part IV, this Comment will discuss the
immense impact that Padilla has, and will continue to have, on Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence and the crossover between immigration
and constitutional criminal procedure. This Comment will argue
that Padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure, but that the
rule nonetheless deserves retroactive effect. In light of Padilla’s potential influence, this Comment will argue that the Court has finally
encountered the first new rule that qualifies under Teague’s seemingly
insurmountable watershed exception.
I. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution requires the
government to provide a right to legal redress against unlawful crim21
inal detention. This right, known as the Writ of Habeas Corpus, allows a criminal convict to challenge his conviction in state or federal
court, giving him the opportunity to advance arguments that call into
question the lawfulness of his conviction and sentence. In most instances, a petitioner may only seek habeas relief once he has exhaust22
ed all of his opportunities for direct appeal.
In the two years since the Supreme Court decided Padilla, federal
courts have received an influx of habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of noncitizens seeking to vacate or set aside their sentences based
on the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Padilla. Federal courts
have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which
make up part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”). Section 2241 grants federal courts power to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an individual held in
23
custody in violation of the United States Constitution. Section 2254
provides a federal remedy for state prisoners who are found to be in
state custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United
States. Section 2255 serves as the federal counterpart to § 2254, per-

21
22

23

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State.”).
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006).
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mitting a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress [to] claim[] the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collat24
eral attack . . . .” Generally, habeas petitioners are subject to a oneyear statute of limitations, which runs from the date on which judg25
ment of conviction becomes final. However, if the Supreme Court
recognizes a new constitutional right and permits lower courts to apply the new right retroactively, AEDPA grants petitioners one year to
26
apply for habeas relief based on the new constitutional standard.
Criminal convicts may apply for habeas relief in a number of different circumstances. However, convicts most commonly base their
habeas petitions on Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violations. In
the last few decades, the vast majority of these cases have centered on
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial or plea pro27
ceedings. Although the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee anything more than minimal legal representation in criminal
proceedings, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to confer upon individuals the right to effective assistance of
28
counsel throughout the course of a criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to define the scope of this Sixth
Amendment right in the landmark case Strickland v. Washington. In
Strickland, the defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus following
his murder conviction, claiming that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at his sentencing hearing by failing to investigate
29
and present certain arguments to the sentencing judge. Upon reviewing the defendant’s claims, the Strickland Court delineated a twoprong test for determining whether an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will prevail:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that coun24
25
26
27

28
29

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2008).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. I 2008).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2008).
See, e.g., ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW:
CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14 (1995) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel was, by far, the most common claim asserted by state prisoners in habeas petitions, and that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were found in 25% of
all habeas petitions).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Id. at 675–76.
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sel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
30
trial whose result is reliable.

With respect to the first prong of this test, the Court recognized
the standard for attorney performance as that of reasonably effective
31
assistance. Thus, in order to satisfy the first prong, a defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that “counsel’s
32
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
The Court then expounded on the prejudice prong, requiring the
defendant to show that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
33
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland involved a petitioner who alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel during trial and at sentencing. For a short time, it remained an open question whether the Strickland standard would apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the plea
process. However, a year later, in Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court
affirmed the application of the two-prong Strickland test in the context of a guilty plea, albeit slightly modifying the second Strickland
34
prong. Thus, in addition to proving that his attorney’s performance
was deficient, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea proceedings “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have
35
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Federal and state courts alike now unanimously agree that the
Sixth Amendment requires an attorney to inform his client about the
direct consequences—incarceration, fines, probation, etc.—of a
guilty plea before entering the plea in court. Thus, when a petitioner
claims that his attorney did not inform him of the direct consequences of his guilty plea, courts promptly turn to the Strickland analysis.
However, even after Strickland, many courts continued to assume that
the Sixth Amendment did not require defense counsel to inform a
36
client about a guilty plea’s collateral consequences. Furthermore,
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 687.
Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 770–71 (1970); Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151–52 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Id. at 694.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985).
Id. at 58–59.
Collateral consequences are the additional civil penalties, generally mandated by statute,
that attach to criminal convictions. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006). Collateral consequences may include loss or restriction of professional license, loss of voting rights, ineligibility for public funding,
registration requirements for criminal databases, etc. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W.
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until 2010, many state and federal courts included deportation within
their definition of “collateral consequences.” Accordingly, many
courts did not require defense counsel to explain to their client the
37
fact that a guilty plea could render them automatically deportable.
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court granted a writ
38
of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky to decide whether,
as a matter of federal law, petitioner Jose Padilla’s attorney had an
obligation to advise his client that the offense to which he was plead39
ing guilty would result in automatic deportation. By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court paved the way for a “major upheaval in Sixth
40
Amendment law.”
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Jose Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United
States for over forty years when he was caught driving a truck carrying
41
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Padilla was subsequently indict42
ed for his offense. Upon advice from his court-appointed attorney,
43
Padilla pled guilty to three misdemeanor drug-related charges. Although the plea substantially reduced the amount of time that Padilla

37

38
39
40
41
42
43

Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 697, 699–700 (2002).
See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008); Broomes v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20,
25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764,
768 (11th Cir. 1985) (federal courts applying the collateral consequences doctrine to advice regarding deportation consequences of a guilty plea). See also Oyekoya v. State, 558
So. 2d 990, 990–91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 904 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110 (La. 2002); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93–94
(Pa. 1989) (state courts applying the collateral consequences doctrine to advice regarding
deportation consequences of a guilty plea). In recent years, Congress has adopted and
amended various provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which identifies certain “aggravated felonies” which, if committed,
will subject immigrants to automatic deportation, without giving them an opportunity for
any meaningful form of judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1228 (2006). The
“aggravated felony” category has steadily expanded over the years.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
Id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1477 (Opinion of the Court).
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478; Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
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would spend in custody, his conviction rendered him automatically
44
deportable under revised immigration laws.
Upon application for habeas relief, Padilla claimed that his attorney had not only failed to advise him that his guilty plea would sub45
ject him to deportation proceedings, but had affirmatively told him
that he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he had
46
been in the country so long.” Padilla claimed that he relied on his
counsel’s erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug
charges, and alleged that he would have insisted on going to trial had
47
he not received incorrect advice from his attorney.
Even assuming the truth of Padilla’s allegations, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky denied Padilla’s motion without granting him an
evidentiary hearing. The court based its ruling on the ground that
while the Sixth Amendment guaranteed accurate advice from counsel
regarding the direct consequences of a guilty plea, it did not protect
defendants from clearly erroneous advice regarding deportation because deportation was merely a “collateral consequence” of a convic48
tion. Applying the “collateral consequences” doctrine, the Kentucky
Supreme Court concluded:
As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to advise Appellee of such collateral issue[s] or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly provides no basis for relief. In neither instance is the matter
required to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s failure in that
regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to
49
relief. . . .

After his postconviction petition was denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla petitioned for a writ of certiorari directly to the
50
United States Supreme Court. Padilla’s petition for certiorari highlighted two important questions. The first question was whether “the
mandatory deportation associated with a plea to an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . can still be described as a ‘collateral consequence’ of a criminal conviction which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to ad-

44

45
46
47
48
49
50

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1228 (2006) (defining “aggravated felony” to include “trafficking in a controlled substance” and providing that aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony” may be deported without receiving any form of
review by a federal court).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id.
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
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51

vise[.]” The second question was “whether an attorney’s ‘flagrant’
or ‘gross’ misadvice on a collateral matter, such as mandatory depor52
tation, can constitute grounds for setting aside the guilty plea.” On
February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set out
53
to answer these two questions.
In a 7-2 decision, the Padilla Court rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s formalistic approach and held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform noncitizen clients about
54
immigration consequences before entering a guilty plea. The Court
acknowledged the Kentucky Supreme Court’s avowal of the “collateral consequences” doctrine, and recognized that Kentucky was not
55
alone in adopting that view. Although the members of the Court
equivocated on their own views of the collateral consequences doctrine, the majority made it very clear that the collateral versus direct
distinction was ill-suited to evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
56
claims concerning the specific risk of deportation. As a matter of
law, the Padilla Court removed deportation out of the civil, collateral
consequence realm, and for the first time in Supreme Court history,
applied the Strickland analysis to an attorney’s failure to advise his cli57
ent of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
As the
Court stated, “[t]he severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banishment or exile, . . .’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel
58
to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”
Padilla is now well-settled law going forward. Criminal defense attorneys now have an affirmative obligation to inform their clients
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, and failure to
do so may properly give rise to a claim for habeas relief. However, as
with all constitutional cases, the Padilla decision did not immediately
alleviate the problems faced by the hundreds of noncitizens who, at
the time, faced deportation after having received deficient information at a plea proceeding. Consequently, courts have been left
with the burdensome task of determining the retroactivity of Padilla’s

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 555 U.S. 1169 (2009).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
Id. at 1481.
Id. at 1481–82.
Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (internal citation
omitted)).
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59

central holding. State and federal courts have split regarding the
retroactive application of Padilla, and courts have spent countless
hours considering these backward-looking Padilla claims. As is the
case with all habeas matters, determination of this issue could result
in the reversal of many state and federal prisoners’ convictions. More
importantly, courts ruling on Padilla’s retroactivity stand to significantly impact the number of noncitizens facing deportation as a consequence of their conviction. If Padilla were found to apply retroactively, many current inmates who will face deportation after the
conclusion of their prison sentence would have the opportunity to
challenge their convictions due to the fact that their attorneys did not
inform them that a guilty plea would result in automatic deportation.
In this case, perhaps now more than ever, determination on the issue
of retroactivity will have a significant impact on the scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling.
III. SURVEYING THE COURTS
Since the Supreme Court decided Padilla in 2010, hundreds of petitioners have filed for habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment due to their attorneys’
failure to advise them of the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea. Given Padilla’s recent status, the overwhelming majority of these petitioners seek retroactive application of Padilla’s central holding.
Courts have adopted various approaches to handle these claims and,
as a result, have come to very different conclusions regarding retroactivity. Many courts have refused to address the issue of retroactivity
and have dismissed petitioners’ claims under a straightforward application of Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard. Other
courts have instead chosen to tackle the issue of retroactivity head-on.
Courts that have selected this approach have assumed different positions regarding Padilla’s status as a “new rule” or an “old rule.” This
judgment has proven to be outcome-determinative in each and every
case considering Padilla’s retroactivity. This Section will explore the
various approaches that state and lower federal courts have adopted
to handle the retroactivity of Padilla, and will explain the possible
flaws in many of the lower courts’ arguments.
59

See Maria Baldini-Potermin, Padilla v. Kentucky One Year Later: Courts Split over Interpretation and Application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Constitutional Holdings, 88 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1449, 1450–51 (June 13, 2011) (noting cases in which courts evaluated claims of
ineffective assistance based on failure to inform about a guilty plea’s deportation consequences).
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A. Courts Eschewing Padilla’s Retroactivity
When called upon to determine the retroactivity of Padilla, many
state and federal courts have assumed, for argument’s sake, that the
Strickland analysis would apply to the given claim, and have then dismissed those Padilla-based claims under either the first or second
prong of Strickland. Take, for example, the Western District of Wash60
ington’s ruling in Torres v. United States in October 2011. Petitioner
Uriel Valdovinos Torres pled guilty to one charge of conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance and was sentenced to 120 months of
incarceration on December 7, 2009, a few months before the Supreme Court decided Padilla. Torres filed a § 2255 habeas petition
based on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney allegedly failed to inform him that his guilty plea
61
would subject him to deportation, and that he would not qualify for
62
cancellation of removal. Given that Torres’ conviction became final
before the Supreme Court issued Padilla, Torres sought to retroactively apply the rule announced in Padilla to his claim on collateral
63
review. After briefly discussing the current controversy over Padilla’s
retroactivity, the court decided that it need not resolve the issue of
whether Padilla states a new rule or merely restates existing law, because even assuming Padilla did apply retroactively, Torres’ claim
64
would not satisfy either of the Strickland prongs.
The Torres court first considered whether Torres’ attorney had
65
fallen below “an objective standard of reasonableness.” The court
found that “unlike the attorney in Padilla who told Padilla that he
‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in
the country so long,’ [Torres’ attorney had] told him that his crime
was an aggravated felony” that could subject him to deportation, although she did not tell him that a guilty plea would result in automat-

60
61
62

63
64
65

No. C10-5896, 2011 WL 5025148 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2011).
Id. at *1.
In order to qualify for cancellation of removal, an alien must show that: (1) he has been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years
immediately preceding the date of such application; (2) he has been a person of good
moral character during such period; (3) he has not been convicted of certain crimes; and
(4) removal would result in exceptional and unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006).
Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
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66

ic deportation. Despite the fact that Torres’ attorney did not paint a
complete picture for Torres, the court lauded her for providing
Torres with technically correct information, and concluded that her
performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable67
ness under Strickland.
Although the court could have dismissed Torres’ claim based on
Torres’ failure to satisfy the first Strickland prong, the court went on
to consider Torres’ claim under Strickland’s prejudice prong. Torres
maintained that had he known that accepting a plea agreement
meant foregoing his opportunity to pursue cancellation of removal
from the United States, he would not have accepted the plea and
68
would instead have gone to trial.
However, the court rejected
Torres’ claim, recognizing that Torres would not have been eligible
for cancellation of removal even if he had gone to trial, because he
69
had not been in the country long enough before being arrested.
Finding that Torres had failed to prove the requisite level of prejudice, the court dismissed Torres’ Padilla-based claim without address70
ing the issue of retroactivity.
66
67

68
69
70

Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *5 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478
(2010)).
Id. Accord United States v. Stubbs, No. 2:02-cr-61-FtM-29DNF, 2011 WL 3566839, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2011); Obomighie v. United States, Civ. No. 11-746, Cr. No. 91-391,
2011 WL 2938218, at *3 (D. Md. July 18, 2011); Jae Myung Pak v. United States, Civ. No.
10-1982, Cr. No. 92-49, 2011 WL 1298559, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2011); SanchezContreras v. United States, Nos. 10-CV-4008, 08-CR-4079, 2011 WL 939005, at *3 (N.D.
Iowa Mar. 16, 2011); Gill v. United States, Nos. CV-10-3786, CR-07-1382, 2010 WL
4916642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (district court cases as of March 2012, assuming
retroactivity, but dismissing claim on first Strickland prong).
Torres, 2011 WL 5025148, at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. Accord Robles v. Cate, No. CIV S-10-3398, 2011 WL 4710800, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2011); Quijada v. United States, Nos. 2:10-CV-403, 05-CR-171(6), 2011 WL 4687534, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2011); Richards v. United States, Nos. 11 CV 1341, 09 CR 562, 2011
WL 3875335, at *3, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2011); Infante v. United States, Nos. 8:11-CV1525-T-17TBM, 8:95-CR-288-T-17TBM, 2011 WL 3268426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2011);
Hill v. New York, No. 10-CV-0150, 2011 WL 2671506, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 2011); Gonzalez v. United States, No. 5:11-cv-197-Oc-36DNF, 2011 WL 1811655, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May
12, 2011); Limones v. United States, Nos. 1:07-CR-356-5-TWT, 1:10-CV-2265-TWT, 2011
WL 1157371, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2011); 1:10-CV-2265, 2011 WL 1157371, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 29, 2011); United States v. Aceves, Civ. No. 10-00738, Cr. No. 08-00501, 2011 WL
976706, at *4 (D. Haw. Mar. 17, 2011); Banos v. United States, Nos. 10-23314 CIV, 9800015 CR, 2011 WL 835799, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2011); Smith v. United States, Nos.
10-21507-Civ, 09-20952-Cr, 2011 WL 837747, at *9, *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2011);
Gudiel-Soto v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238–39 (D.N.J. 2011); Brown v. United
States, No. 10 Civ. 3012, 2010 WL 5313546, at *4, *5, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2010); United
States v. Gutierrez Martinez, Civ. No. 10-2553, Cr. No. 07-91(5), 2010 WL 5266490, at *2,
*3 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010); Falcon v. D.H.S., No. SACV 07-66, 2010 WL 5651187, at *10
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010); LaPorte v. Artus, No. 9:06-cv-1459, 2010 WL 4781475, at *2
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In an exercise of caution, many courts have taken the route that
the Torres court took, assuming for argument’s sake that Padilla applies retroactively, but dismissing the petitioner’s Strickland claim on
the merits, either under the deficient performance prong, the prejudice prong, or, as in Torres, both prongs. This trend illustrates the extreme difficulty that petitioners will face when raising Padilla claims,
even if the Supreme Court were to declare that Padilla applies retroactively. By avoiding the issue of retroactivity, lower courts can reduce the number of cases that go up on appeal, and are thus able to
moderate the “floodgates” fear that courts often face when deciding
whether a case applies retroactively. Courts tend to prefer this more
passive approach. Unfortunately, courts were only able to delay the
issue of Padilla’s retroactivity for so long. While courts have succeeded in dismissing many claims on a straightforward Strickland analysis,
there remain a large number of claims that would not fail under either Strickland prong. These cases have required courts to confront
the issue of retroactivity head-on.
B. Courts Confronting Padilla’s Retroactivity
Where courts have come across Padilla claims where counsel’s effectiveness clearly fails under both Strickland prongs, they have been
forced to apply the Supreme Court’s somewhat muddled retroactivity
doctrine to determine whether the petitioner can benefit from retroactive application of the Sixth Amendment standard recognized in
Padilla. After briefly reviewing the history of the retroactivity doctrine
in federal habeas proceedings, and laying out the standards that govern retroactivity of new constitutional rules, this Section will explain
the two approaches adopted by federal courts addressing retrospective Padilla claims.
1. Retroactivity Doctrine in Federal Habeas Proceedings
The Supreme Court has struggled with the retroactive application
of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure for decades. “Before 1965, the Supreme Court assumed that all of its decisions should

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010); Haddad v. United States, Civ. No. 07-12540, Cr. No. 97-80150,
2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010); United States v. Millan, Nos.
3:06cr458, 3:10cv165, 2010 WL 2557699, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2010) (district court
cases as of March 2012, assuming retroactivity, but dismissing claim on second Strickland
prong).
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71

apply retroactively.” However, when the Court started to selectively
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states in the 1960s, it began
to recognize the harsh burden that a presumption of retroactivity
72
would impose on state courts. To help alleviate this burden, the
Court enunciated a three-part test to be applied to cases involving a
73
question of retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker. At issue in Linkletter
74
was the retroactivity of the new exclusionary rule established in
75
Mapp v. Ohio. In the Linkletter Court’s view, retroactivity was to be
determined “by examining the purpose of the [new] rule, the reliance of the States on prior law, and the effect on the administration
76
of justice of a retroactive application of the [new] rule.” Applying
this three-part test, the Court in Linkletter held that the exclusionary
77
rule would not apply retroactively in collateral habeas proceedings.
For the next several years, courts applied the Linkletter test irrespective of whether the case came before the court on direct or collateral review. However, Linkletter was met with immense dissatisfac78
tion from jurists at every level, and by the late 1980s, the Supreme
Court recognized the need for modifications to the Linkletter rule, es71
72

73
74
75
76
77
78

Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427
(1994).
The process of selective incorporation led to some of the twentieth century’s most influential Supreme Court decisions, including Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment
must be excluded from criminal proceedings in state court), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment against states by holding that state
court defendants have a right to counsel), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment against states and holding that suspects must be informed of their right to an attorney and their right against self-incrimination prior to being questioned by authorities). As a result of these decisions, the nation “move[d] from a
state-based criminal justice system to a criminal justice system that ha[d] to conform with
nationally imposed rules.” See The Supreme Court: A Nation of Liberties (PBS television
broadcast Feb. 7, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/
about/pop_transcript3.html (discussing the impact of selective incorporation on the
criminal justice system in an interview with Professor Joseph F. Kobylka). Had these new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure applied retroactively, state courts would have
faced an overwhelming influx of direct and collateral challenges brought on behalf of
state prisoners, seeking retroactive application of the new rules.
381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
Id. at 621–22.
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 302 (1989) (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–40).
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639.
See, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1557, 1557 n.3, 1558 (1975) (delineating the struggles that lower courts faced in
applying the Linkletter test); James B. Haddad, “Retroactivity Should Be Rethought”: A Call for
the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 419–20
(1969) (discussing the positions of various Supreme Court justices regarding the Linkletter
test).
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79

pecially in the criminal context. In a series of dissenting opinions,
Justice Harlan deeply criticized the Linkletter test and argued that the
Court should retroactively apply new rules to all convictions that were
80
not yet final at the time the new rule was announced. The Court
81
adopted Harlan’s arguments in Griffith v. Kentucky, holding that
“failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adju82
dication.”
Inspired by Justice Harlan and the decision in Griffith, the Supreme Court finally embraced a distinction between cases on direct
review and cases on collateral review, and established a more coher83
ent test for retroactivity in Teague v. Lane. In Teague, the petitioner,
convicted of attempted murder and other offenses, filed a habeas petition seeking to receive the benefits of the new rule established in
84
Taylor v. Louisiana, which held that the Sixth Amendment required
85
jury venire to be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
The petitioner requested that this fair cross-section requirement be
86
extended to the petit jury that convicted him. The Court, however,
found that it was unnecessary to reach this question, because doing so
87
would require the Court to apply the rule from Taylor retroactively.
The Court announced that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a
88
threshold question,” and set out to “clarify how the question of ret89
roactivity should be resolved for cases on collateral review.” Justice
O’Connor, writing for the plurality, expressed her belief that Linklet-

79

80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

88
89

See Teague, 489 U.S. at 303 (“Not surprisingly, commentators have ‘had a veritable field
day’ with the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly
negative.’”).
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680–81 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[r]efusal to apply new constitutional rules to all
cases arising on direct review” produces “unacceptable ancillary consequences”); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, I have concluded that Linkletter was right in insisting that all ‘new’ rules of constitutional law must, at a
minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this
Court at the time the ‘new’ decision is handed down.”).
479 U.S. 314 (1987).
Id. at 322.
489 U.S. 288, 305, 310 (1989).
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 316 (“Because a decision extending the fair cross section requirement to the petit
jury would not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review under the approach
we adopt today, we do not address petitioner’s claim.”).
Id. at 300.
Id.
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90

ter “require[d] modification,” and thus went on to establish a new
test, which now universally governs the question of retroactivity.
The Court first reaffirmed the implication from Linkletter that “old
91
rules” would apply retroactively on both direct and collateral review.
Under Teague, a rule that is “‘merely an application of the principle
that governed’” a prior Supreme Court case is an old rule that applies
92
retroactively. On the other hand, a case that “breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” is
considered to have announced a “new rule” for purposes of deter93
mining retroactivity. In deciding whether a particular case qualifies
as a “new rule,” courts must consider whether the result of the case
was “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s convic94
tion became final.”
Assuming that most cases announced new rules, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s direct-collateral distinction and held that a new
95
rule receives full retroactivity for cases on direct review. The Court
held, on the other hand, that new rules should rarely apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court established two narrow
exceptions to the general presumption against retroactivity.
First, the Court held that a new rule may apply retroactively if it
placed “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Thus,
new rules that are substantive, and not procedural, fall outside the
Teague constraints. The Court has expounded on this distinction by
explaining that a rule is substantive when “it alters the range of con96
duct or the class of persons the law punishes.” If, however, a new
rule regulates “the manner of determining the defendant’s culpabil97
ity,” it qualifies as a procedural rule that does not apply retroactively.
Second, the Court carved out an exceedingly narrow exception
98
for “watershed rules of criminal procedure” that implicate the “fun99
damental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” A new
rule will only fall under Teague’s watershed exception if it satisfies two
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 301.
Id. at 307.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1988)).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 304.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495
(1990)).
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requirements: (1) “Infringement of the rule must ‘seriously diminish
the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction,’” and (2) “the
rule must ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural ele100
ments essential to the fairness of the proceeding.’” Despite strong
criticism, Teague’s presumption against retroactivity on collateral re101
view remains in effect today.
Teague’s watershed exception is exceptionally rare. Indeed, in the
years following Teague, the Court has “yet to find a new rule that falls
102
under the second Teague exception.”
Since Teague was decided in
1989, the Supreme Court has considered fourteen cases where the
petitioner argued that a new rule is “watershed” in nature and in eve103
ry case the Court has refused to find the rule as such. As a guide to
the type of rule that would receive watershed status, the Court has repeatedly identified the universal right to counsel in criminal proceed104
105
ings established in Gideon v. Wainwright. Nevertheless, the Court
in Teague made sure to highlight the rarity of such a landmark case,
and stated that it was “unlikely that many such components of basic
106
due process have yet to emerge.”
The Teague precedent has come under fire in the last few decades,
in part due to the extremely narrow application of Teague’s watershed
100
101

102
103

104

105
106

Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at
311).
Courts frequently interpret the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, to have codified the Teague analysis.
Whorton, 549 U.S. at 415 n.3. For a discussion of relevant AEDPA provisions, see supra
Part I. Petitions filed under AEDPA make up the vast majority of habeas petitions filed
today, and only become necessary when the petitioner requests review of a final conviction. A case becomes final “where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed” before the
decision for which retroactive application is sought. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
622 n.5 (1965). The Teague presumption against retroactivity only exists in the criminal
context, and more specifically, only applies to cases on collateral review. The question of
civil adjudicatory retroactivity remains a murky area and is outside the scope of this
Comment.
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004).
For a brief overview of the post-Teague cases that have contemplated retroactivity, see Ezra
D. Landes, A New Approach To Overcoming the Insurmountable “Watershed Rule” Exception To
Teague’s Collateral Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1, 10 n.67 (2009).
See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (“Whatever one may think of the importance of respondent’s proposed rule, it has none of the primacy and centrality of the
rule adopted in Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be within the exception.”);
Beard, 542 U.S. at 420 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 485, 495 (1990)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)); Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (all reaffirming Gideon’s position as the quintessential watershed rule).
372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
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107

exception. Moreover, scholars have identified an inherent conflict
in the Court’s reasoning in Teague, which has led to much confusion
among the lower courts when applying Teague’s retroactivity princi108
ples.
The Teague Court made clear that old rules are retroactive,
while new rules are not. Thus, in order for a court to deny retroactivity under Teague, it must first find that the rule in question is “new”
because it was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the de109
fendant’s conviction became final.” Nevertheless, at the same time,
the court must find that the “new” rule does not fall under Teague’s
watershed exception, because it does not “‘alter our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements’ essential to the fairness of a pro110
ceeding.”
Ezra D. Landes, a California criminal defense attorney,
has poignantly identified this conflict as follows: “the Court must eschew obviousness to satisfy the need for newness, while at the same
111
time acknowledging obviousness to avoid ‘watershedness.’”
This
inherent tension rears its ugly head every time the Court considers
retroactivity under Teague, and yet the Court has repeatedly ignored
the conflict and struck down every retroactivity claim premised on
Teague’s watershed exception.
As soon as the Court decided Padilla in 2010, lower courts were
inundated with habeas petitions arguing for retroactivity. The surge
of habeas petitions has forced lower courts to confront the inherent
tension in Teague once again, in attempting to determine whether the
rule announced in Padilla represents a new constitutional rule, and, if
so, whether Padilla falls under Teague’s watershed exception. State
112
courts and lower federal courts today remain split on this issue. To
107

108

109
110
111
112

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1817 (1991) (“Equally troubling is the narrowness
of the exceptions to Teague’s rule barring consideration of new law claims.”). See also Barry Friedman, Pas De Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2467, 2496 & n.143 (1993) (stating that “Teague should be overruled,” and that quite
“[f]rankly, the Court ought to be just a little embarrassed with itself”); David R. Dow,
Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 50 n.155 (1991) (citing additional articles that criticize
Teague).
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may
not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes.”).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (emphasis omitted)).
Landes, supra note 103, at 16.
E.g., compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that Padilla did not announce a new rule, and therefore applies retroactively) with Chaidez v.
United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Chang Hong, 671
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date, no court has found Padilla to apply retroactively under Teague’s
watershed exception. However, in light of the significant impact that
Padilla stands to have on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it may be
time for the courts to finally recognize Padilla as the first case in history to fall under Teague’s “watershed” exception.
a. Old Rule, Retroactive
It was only a matter of time before the courts encountered a Padilla claim that satisfied both Strickland prongs and would thus be
forced to determine the retroactivity of Padilla’s central holding. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the first federal appellate court to
encounter such a claim, took up the issue in the summer of 2011 in
113
United States v. Orocio.
The Third Circuit’s holding in Orocio laid a
foundation for understanding Padilla’s rule as one that applies retroactively on collateral review.
Gerald Orocio pled guilty to one count of possession of a con114
trolled substance on October 7, 2004.
This conviction rendered
Orocio automatically deportable, and removal proceedings were ini115
tiated against Orocio several years later.
Orocio then filed a peti116
tion for writ of error coram nobis to challenge the plea conviction.
Orocio argued that his attorney’s failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal drug charge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
117
Amendment. A New Jersey District Court denied Orocio’s petition,
and Orocio appealed. While Orocio’s appeal was still pending, the
118
Supreme Court decided Padilla.
Seizing this opportunity, Orocio
sought to retroactively avail himself of the rule established in Pa119
dilla.

113
114
115
116

117
118
119

F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011) (both finding that Padilla announced a new rule that
did not fall under either Teague exception, and that Padilla therefore did not apply retroactively).
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 633–34.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Federal courts have the power to vacate a judgment of conviction by granting the ancient
writ of error coram nobis as a last resort to petitioners who have exhausted or waived any
statutory right of review, and who thus cannot obtain collateral relief through any alternative remedy. This extraordinary remedy is granted “only under circumstances compelling
such action to achieve justice.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954).
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 634.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 637.
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Acknowledging that Orocio had established a prima facie case
under Strickland, the Orocio court set out to tackle the issue of Padilla’s
retroactive application to Orocio’s claim. In order to do so, the court
recognized that it would need to determine whether Padilla announced a new rule or merely applied Strickland in a new context.
Under Teague, an old rule would apply retroactively, while a new rule
would not, unless it fell under one of Teague’s narrow exceptions.
The court in Orocio identified three principles that guide the “new
rule” inquiry:
(1) “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding under
Teague that the rule at issue was dictated by . . . precedent,” (2) “Strickland
is a rule of general applicability which asks whether counsel’s conduct
was objectively reasonable and conformed to professional norms based
‘on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s
conduct,’” and (3) “it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so
120
novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”

The court acknowledged that Padilla was indeed the first Supreme
Court case to apply Strickland to an attorney’s failure to advise his cli121
But altent about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.
122
hough no case law existed “on all fours” with Padilla, the Orocio
court nonetheless believed that Strickland included enough breathing
room to have encompassed Jose Padilla’s claim without creating a
123
new rule of criminal procedure. In the court’s view, when Jose Padilla pled guilty, it was “hardly novel” for an attorney to provide advice to his client at the plea stage concerning the immigration conse124
quences of a guilty plea.
The Third Circuit is not alone in holding this position. District
Courts sitting in the Ninth Circuit similarly hold that Padilla represents an “old rule” for Teague purposes and should thus apply retroac125
tively on collateral review.
The current leading case in the Ninth
120
121

122
123
124

125

Id. at 639 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted) (summarizing the effect of Teague and
Strickland on the inquiry into whether Padilla announced a new rule).
Id. at 637 (“It is true that the precise question of whether the civil removal consequences
of a plea are within the scope of Strickland had never been addressed by the Supreme
Court before Padilla.”).
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 640–41.
Id. at 639 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (“For at least the past
15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide
advice on the [removal] consequences of a client’s plea.”)).
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue, federal district
courts in the Ninth Circuit almost unanimously apply Padilla retroactively. For examples
of the Ninth Circuit’s retroactive application of Padilla, see United States v. Hurtado-Villa,
Nos. CV-10-01814, CR-08-01249, 2011 WL 4852284, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2011); Song v.
United States, Nos. CV 09-5184, CR 98-0806, 2011 WL 2533184, at *2 n.1 (June 27, 2011);
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126

Circuit is United States v. Hubenig.
Andrew Hubenig’s attorney advised him to plead guilty to a number of offenses committed while he
was visiting Yosemite National Park. At the time Hubenig’s attorney
offered this advice, he was aware that Hubenig was a Canadian citizen, and nonetheless failed to discuss with Hubenig whether a guilty
plea to the pending charges would affect his immigration status. On
his attorney’s advice, Hubenig pled guilty, rendering him automatically deportable. Hubenig filed for a writ of error coram nobis alleging a Sixth Amendment violation based on the holding in Padilla.
Like the court in Orocio, the Hubenig court held that Padilla merely
reiterated the old Strickland rule in a new context, and would there127
fore apply retroactively to Hubenig’s claim on collateral review. As
justification for this holding, the Hubenig court cited three recent
Supreme Court opinions applying the Strickland test in a variety of
128
129
different factual contexts: Rompilla v. Beard, Wiggins v. Smith, and
130
Williams v. Taylor. The Hubenig court noted that none of these cases
131
Curiously, howhave been afforded new rule status under Teague.
ever, each of the cases cited in Hubenig required the Supreme Court
to review decisions by state courts that were “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of” the Strickland standard, under 28

126
127

128

129

130

131

United States v. Krboyan, Nos. 1:10-cv-02016, 1:02-cr-05438, 2011 WL 2117023, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. May 27, 2011).
No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
Id. at *8; accord Jiminez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-1528, 2011 WL 3667628, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
19, 2011); United States v. Reid, No. 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 4, 2011); Song v. United States, Nos. CV 09-5184, CR 98-0806, 2011 WL 2940316, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011); United States v. Dass, No. 05-140 (3), 2011 WL 2746181, at
*4–5 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011); United States v. Krboyan, Nos. 1:02-cr-05438, 1:10-cv02016, 2011 WL 2117023, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011); United States v. Zhong Lin, No.
3:07-CR-44, 2011 WL 197206, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2011); Luna v. United States, No.
10CV1659, 2010 WL 4868062, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010); Al Kokabani v. United
States, Nos. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 5:08-CV-177-FL, 2010 WL 3941836, at *6 (E.D.N.C. July 30,
2010) (district court cases that remain good law within their circuits as of March 2012,
holding that Padilla did not announce a new rule).
545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (applying Strickland to defense counsel’s failure to examine the
court file on defendant’s prior conviction for rape and assault during the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial).
539 U.S. 510, 524, 533 (2003) (applying Strickland to counsel’s decision not to expand
investigation of petitioner’s life history for mitigating evidence beyond presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and department of social services records).
529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000) (applying Strickland to defense attorney’s failure to investigate
and present substantial mitigating evidence during sentencing phase of capital murder
trial).
United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1,
2010).
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132

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In all of these cases, lower federal courts reviewing the state court decisions on habeas review had previously
identified § 2254(d)(1) as the governing standard for the given set of
133
facts.
These cases are easily distinguishable from Padilla. Padilla
came to the United States Supreme Court directly from the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, without going through the traditional line of habeas review in lower federal courts. Thus, the Supreme Court in Padilla never even considered whether the lower court’s decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” the Strickland standard. Instead, the Supreme Court, for the first time in history, reinterpreted the underlying principles in Strickland to apply in a
completely new factual context. Plainly put, Padilla was not was not
merely a reiteration of the old Strickland standard. For that reason
alone Padilla could be considered a “new rule” for Teague purposes.
Despite this potential flaw, the reasoning in Orocio and Hubenig
represents a step in the right direction. Both courts highlighted the
Supreme Court’s statement in Padilla that it had “given serious consideration” to the argument that its ruling would open the “flood134
gates” to new litigation challenging prior guilty pleas.
The Orocio
and Hubenig courts were correct in arguing that the entire “floodgates” discussion would have been unnecessary if the Supreme Court
intended Padilla to be a new rule that would apply only prospective135
ly. However, by automatically concluding that Padilla was therefore
intended to be an “old rule,” these courts ignored the possibility that
the Supreme Court intended Padilla to be a “new rule” that nevertheless applied retroactively through one of the Teague exceptions. It is
thus useful to review those cases that have considered the application
of Teague’s “watershed” exception.

132

133

134
135

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal courts hold habeas jurisdiction over individuals in state custody when their conviction in state court resulted from a “decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
An individual in state custody may apply for habeas relief after exhausting his state court
remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006), if the decision in state court “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7; United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir.
2011) (both citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484–85 (2010)).
Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7; Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641.
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b. New Rule, Not Retroactive
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have now affirmatively recognized Padilla as a “new rule” for Teague purposes, and have thus declined to extend retroactive application to Padilla’s Sixth Amendment
standards pursuant to Teague’s non-retroactivity rule. In August of
2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a coram nobis
petition filed on behalf of Roselva Chaidez, an alien subjected to de136
portation following her conviction for mail fraud.
Chaidez’s petition alleged that her trial counsel offered ineffective assistance by failing to inform her that her guilty plea carried the risk of
137
deportation. As Chaidez’s conviction became final prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, Chaidez sought retroactive applica138
tion of the Sixth Amendment standards announced in Padilla. Applying Teague, the Chaidez court held that Padilla announced a new
rule of criminal procedure that did not apply retroactively on collat139
eral review.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court acknowledged that Padilla
was in fact an extension of Strickland. However, the court correctly
noted that this fact does not speak to whether Padilla announced a
140
new rule.
In deciding whether Padilla was a new rule, the court
considered whether the result in Padilla was dictated by prior prece141
dent at the time that Jose Padilla’s conviction became final.
The
court concluded that Padilla’s outcome was “susceptible to reasonable
142
debate” at the time that Padilla was decided. That the members of
the Padilla Court expressed such an “array of views” indicated to the
Chaidez court that Padilla was not, in fact, dictated by precedent. In
the Chaidez court’s view, the Padilla concurrence left no doubt that
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts considered the case to be
143
ground-breaking. This sentiment of the concurrence, coupled with
136
137
138
139
140

141
142
143

Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 692 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (“[T]he fact that a court
says that its decision is within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision, or indeed that it
is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the
current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”)).
Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 689, 694.
Id. at 689 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488, 1491, 1492 (2010) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (referring to the majority’s holding as a “dramatic departure from precedent,” “a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law,” and a “dramatic expansion of the
scope of criminal defense counsel’s duties under the Sixth Amendment”)).
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the fact that two Justices issued a dissenting opinion chiding the majority for breaking with precedent, convinced the Chaidez court that
Padilla announced a “new rule” that was not dictated by prior prece144
dent.
In April of this year, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the parties in Chaidez. The Court’s decision this fall will settle
once and for all whether Padilla created a “new rule” that is subject to
further Teague analysis. However, because both parties in Chaidez
have stipulated that if Padilla announced a new rule, neither of
145
Teague’s exceptions to non-retroactivity would apply, the Supreme
Court is not likely to weigh in on Padilla’s qualification under
Teague’s watershed exception.
To date, at least three circuit courts of appeals have considered
the application of the second Teague exception to Padilla’s ruling. In
August of 2011, the Tenth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals
146
to weigh in on the new circuit split in United States v. Chang Hong.
In September of 2010, several months after the Supreme Court decided Padilla, Chang Hong filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea,
alleging that his counsel offered ineffective assistance by failing to inform him that pleading guilty to his offense would subject him to automatic deportation. Noting that the Supreme Court had never applied Strickland to the collateral consequences of conviction, the
Chang Hong court followed Chaidez’s lead and concluded that Padilla
147
announced a new rule that was not dictated by prior precedent.
The court’s reasoning behind this part of the conclusion is persuasive, and has found support among many lower courts, as well as
148
from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals this past May. However, the
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 689–90.
Id. at 688. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 7.
671 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1155.
See United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 212–13 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e join the Seventh
and Tenth Circuits in holding that Padilla announced a ‘new’ rule within the meaning of
Teague.”). See also Ufele v. United States, 825 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2011);
United States v. Garcia, Nos. 2:88-cr-31-FtM-29DNF, 2:89-cr-32-FtM-29, 2011 WL 5024628,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2011); Sarria v. United States, No. 11-20730-CIV, 2011 WL
4949724, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011); United States v. Abraham, No. 8:09CR126, 2011
WL 3882290, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2011); Zoa v. United States, Civ. No. 10-2823, Cr.
No. 06-235, 2011 WL 3417116, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011); United States v. Chapa, 800 F.
Supp. 2d 1216, 1221–22 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2011); Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011); Ellis v. United States, 806 F.
Supp. 2d 538, 548 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011); Dennis v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 425,
429 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2011); Mendoza v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 24, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. Jan. 4, 2011);
United States v. Hough, No. 2:02-cr-00649-1, 2010 WL 5250996, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Dec. 17,
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deductions that followed from this conclusion are less compelling.
Because the parties in Chang Hong had not filed any stipulations, the
court next took it upon itself to determine whether Padilla fell under
149
Teague’s “watershed” exception. The court identified Gideon as the
paradigmatic example of a case that fit this exception. But when
called upon to determine whether Padilla similarly fit the exception,
150
the only answer the court could give was, “Padilla is not Gideon.”
As support for its “Padilla is not Gideon” stance, the Chang Hong
court stated:
[Padilla] does not affect the determination of a defendant’s
guilt . . . . Padilla would only be at issue in cases where the defendant admits guilt and pleads guilty. In such situations, because the defendant’s
guilt is established through his own admission . . . Padilla is simply not
germane to concerns about risks of inaccurate convictions or fundamen151
tal procedural fairness.

This same unsubstantiated argument was again advanced several
months later by the Eleventh Circuit in Figuereo-Sanchez v. United
152
States.
In Figuereo-Sanchez, the Eleventh Circuit assumed, for argu153
ment’s sake, that Padilla announced a new rule, but refused to apply the rule retroactively because it concluded that Padilla did not fall
154
under the second Teague exception.
Although the court acknowledged that “a guilty plea as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel
155
may result in an inaccurate conviction,” it refused to accept that
“ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is on par with deprivation of
counsel under Gideon in terms of its presumed effect on the accuracy
156
of the proceedings.”
The “Padilla is not Gideon” argument arose most recently in the
Fourth Circuit’s decision denying Padilla’s retroactive effect in United

149

150
151
152
153
154
155
156

2010); United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9,
2010); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-1, 2010 WL 4134286, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct.
19, 2010) (district court cases that remain good law within their respective circuits as of
March 2012, holding that Padilla announced a new rule).
United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2011). Because Padilla’s
rule is procedural and not substantive, the Court did not consider the first Teague exception. Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
678 F.3d 1203 (2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 27, 2012) (No. 12164).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1208–09.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
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157

States v. Mathur.
As compared to Gideon, the Mathur court found
that Padilla was “much more limited in scope” and had a “far less direct and profound” relationship with the “accuracy of the factfinding
158
process.” The Fourth Circuit noted that Padilla violations only occur once a defendant has pled guilty and submitted himself to sentencing. In the court’s view, “[w]hen such a defendant is surprised at
a later date by the initiation of deportation proceedings that were not
forecast by defense counsel, the injustice, while real, nevertheless
does not cast doubt on the verity of the defendant’s admission of
159
guilt.”
This position ignores the many petitioners’ arguments that they
pled guilty not because they admitted guilt, but because their attorneys advised them to accept a plea deal to avoid harsher consequences that could potentially arise out of a wrongful conviction for a
greater charged offense. If petitioners knew that a guilty plea could
lead to deportation, then they might choose to accept the risk of
wrongful conviction if, in doing so, they could potentially avoid removal. In such situations, Padilla would certainly be “germane to
160
concerns about risks of inaccurate convictions.”
The “Padilla is not Gideon” argument can also be seen in a number
of lower court decisions considering whether Padilla fits Teague’s wa161
tershed exception, and to date, no court has truly provided an adequate analysis of the possibility. However, the Supreme Court may
have the opportunity to weigh in on the possibility this fall when it
162
rules in Chaidez.
Indeed, amicus briefs filed with the Supreme
Court in Chaidez’s case indicate that many, if not most, immigrants,
when properly advised by counsel, would choose to go to trial before
157
158
159
160
161

162

685 F.3d 396, 399 (2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012 WL 4842975 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2012) (No.
12-439).
Id. (quoting Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007)).
Id. at 400.
See United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:10-CV-23718, 2011 WL 3419614, at *7 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 4, 2011); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“‘However laudable’ a rule requiring that noncitizen defendants be informed of the immigration
consequences of plea bargains might be, such a rule ‘has none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon.’” (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 420
(2004))).
The parties in Figuereo-Sanchez and in Mathur have also recently filed petitions for certiorari, which the Court will likely consider sometime after it hears oral arguments in
Chaidez. It is likely that the court will defer action on these petitions until after it has decided Chaidez, since Chaidez will likely be dispositive on the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity.
However, it is possible that the Court’s ruling in Chaidez might fail to answer the question of whether Padilla falls under the second Teague exception. If that were the case,
these pending petitions for certiorari might become more appealing to the Court.
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a jury rather than face the automatic immigration consequences of a
163
In light of this argument, the Supreme Court might
guilty plea.
choose to acknowledge that Padilla’s ruling truly affects the accuracy
of criminal convictions.
2. Identifying the Tension in Determining Padilla’s Retroactivity
To date, no federal or state court has extended retroactive treatment to Padilla under the second Teague exception reserved for “watershed rules of criminal procedure.” However, a number of courts
have danced around the issue, and at the very least, have left room to
argue for this possibility. Consider, for example, the opinion issued
164
in Santos-Sanchez v. United States. Jesus Natividad Santos-Sanchez was
charged with aiding and abetting the illegal entry of a Mexican alien.
Santos-Sanchez pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to
probation. Because Santos-Sanchez was a resident alien at the time of
his plea, the resulting conviction rendered Santos-Sanchez automatically deportable upon completion of his probation. Santos-Sanchez
filed a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his attorney had offered ineffective assistance when he failed to inform him about the
165
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Santos-Sanchez’s petition made it all the way up to the United States Supreme Court, but
during the pendency of Santos-Sanchez’s petition, the Supreme
Court decided Padilla. Santos-Sanchez’s case was thus remanded for
166
further proceedings consistent with Padilla, perhaps signaling to the
lower court the potential for retroactive application of Padilla’s rul167
ing.
On remand, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
attempted to determine whether Padilla applies retroactively, and de163

164
165
166
167

See Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Legal Resource Center and Immigrant Defense Project as Amici Curiae Supporting of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 19,
at 10 (noting that the immigration consequences of a conviction are often the greatest
priority to immigrant clients).
No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011).
Id. at *1.
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
The Supreme Court’s decision to remand Santos-Sanchez, rather than to take the opportunity to rule on the retroactivity of Padilla through the Santos-Sanchez vehicle, could be
interpreted to imply Padilla’s retroactive effect. See, e.g. Danielle M. Lang, Comment, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect Of Plea Colloquy Warnings On Defendants’ Ability To Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 971–72 (2012) (arguing that Padilla should apply retroactively, but only because Padilla was not a “new rule” for Teague purposes). Although
not dispositive on the issue, the Court’s decision to remand may have served as an implicit starting point for the Santos-Sanchez court’s retroactivity analysis on remand.
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cided outright that it must apply retroactively, because, in the court’s
view, Padilla itself came to the Supreme Court on collateral review,
168
The court apand it “both announced and applied its own rule.”
plied Teague and concluded that, had the rule not been intended to
apply retroactively, it would not have applied to the petitioner in Padilla, but would only apply to subsequent defendants bringing Padilla
169
claims.
The court then worked backwards to determine which of
three scenarios applied to Padilla: “(1) Padilla announced an old
rule; (2) Padilla announced a new rule and the first Teague exception
applies; or (3) Padilla announced a new rule and the second Teague
exception applies.” All three scenarios—and only these three scenar170
ios—would lead to retroactivity.
The court ultimately discarded all three scenarios. Like the
Chaidez and Chang Hong courts, the Santos-Sanchez court determined
that Padilla did not reiterate an old rule, because reasonable jurists
could have disagreed about the requirements of the Sixth Amend171
ment prior to Padilla. The court likewise dismissed the second scenario, because Padilla announced a procedural rather than a substan172
tive rule, and thus did not fall under the first Teague exception.
Finally, in a total of five sentences, the court dismissed the possibility
that Padilla fell under the second Teague exception, offering the same
173
“Padilla is not Gideon” argument advanced by the Chang Hong court.
Thoroughly confounded, the court ultimately abandoned its
quest, and concluded that “Padilla’s holding could not be readily rec174
onciled with the Teague framework.”
Nevertheless, because all
roads would lead to retroactivity, and would thus require the court to
168

169

170
171
172
173

174

Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691, at *3 & *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011).
The Court discussed Graham v. Collins, in which the Supreme Court made it clear that
when a case is on collateral review and the holding sought by the defendant would announce a new rule that does not fit a Teague exception, the Court will refuse to apply or
announce the rule in that case. 506 U.S. 461, 463, 477–78 (1993).
Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 at *10. As is discussed below, this premise is flawed. The Supreme Court took Padilla’s case on direct review of the state’s collateral
proceedings—not on collateral review of a state court decision. Under Danforth v. Minnesota,
128 S.Ct. 1029, 1038 (2008), Teague’s retroactivity doctrine does not bind state courts in
state collateral proceedings. Therefore, Teague would not have applied during the Supreme Court’s direct review of Kentucky’s collateral proceedings.
Santos-Sanchez, 2011 WL 3793691 at *3.
Id. at *6–9.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *10 (“[T]he Supreme Court has pointed to Gideon v. Wainwright, as the prototypical
example of a decision that implicates the second Teague exception. . . . In light of this incredibly high threshold, it seems improper to consider Padilla holding (sic) to be a ‘watershed rule of criminal procedure.’”).
Id.

Nov. 2012]

PADILLA V. KENTUCKY

697

reach the merits of the petitioner’s claims, the court found it unnec175
essary to choose among the three unsatisfactory scenarios.
The opinion in Santos-Sanchez may not stand as the most pristine
specimen of legal analysis, and there are certainly flaws in the path
taken by the Santos-Sanchez court. To begin with, the court seems to
have muddled the procedural posture of Padilla itself. Although the
court in Santos-Sanchez indicated that Padilla was before the Supreme
Court on “collateral review,” the court failed to take note of the fact
that the Supreme Court took Padilla’s case on direct review of the
state’s collateral proceedings—not on collateral review of a state court
decision. This is an important distinction, because under existing
Supreme Court precedent, Teague’s retroactivity doctrine does not
176
bind state courts in state collateral proceedings. Thus, the fact that
177
the Supreme Court “both announced and applied its own rule” in
Padilla does not necessarily indicate that the Padilla ruling was intended to apply retroactively on federal habeas to cases that became
final on direct review prior to the Padilla decision.
However, if one were to assume, for argument’s sake, the accuracy
of the Santos-Sanchez court’s initial premise—that Padilla was intended
to announce a retroactive rule because the Supreme Court applied
that rule to the Padilla petitioner himself—the logical reasoning that
followed from that premise is sound. By working backwards, the Santos-Sanchez court seems to have identified the underlying tension created by retroactivity analysis with respect to Padilla. The court implicitly recognized both that Padilla announced a new rule, and that it
was intended to apply retroactively. The court scarcely addressed the
possibility that Teague’s watershed exception would apply to Padilla,
which is unsurprising given courts’ unrelenting reluctance to apply
the exception.
In a footnote, the Santos-Sanchez court “speculate[d] whether Padilla marked the announcement of a third ‘new rule’ exception under Teague that applies exclusively to Padilla’s holding because” of the
178
unique nature of deportation.
Although it is possible that Padilla
created a new exception, such a construct seems unnecessary, given
the possibility that Padilla fits into the existent Teague framework.
Nevertheless, the court seems to be on to something by recognizing
175
176

177
178

Id.
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2008) (holding that Teague did not “explicitly or implicitly constrain[] the authority of the States to provide remedies for a
broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas”).
Santos-Sanchez, No. 5:06-cv-153, 2011 WL 3793691 at *10.
Id. at *10 n.99.
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that Padilla should be an exception to Teague’s general presumption
against retroactivity. It seems that Teague’s watershed exception
would resolve the paradox identified in Santos-Sanchez—a paradox
that has seemed to plague jurists and scholars alike in the debate over
179
Padilla’s retroactivity.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR PADILLA AS A TRULY “WATERSHED” RULING
Despite many courts’ arguments to the contrary, Padilla seems to
have created a “new” constitutional norm that has marked a “major
180
upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”
Prior to 2010, federal courts
adhered to the belief that deportation was a purely civil matter, and
as such, could at best be considered a collateral consequence of conviction. Padilla overcame this formalistic distinction by noting that
the “landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically
181
over the last 90 years.”
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens
sought a middle ground, noting that deportation resulting from a
criminal conviction is now, “because of its close connection to the
criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a
182
collateral consequence.”
Due to the changes in federal immigration law, the Supreme Court recognized the need to institute a
change in its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and in doing so, the
Court broke new ground in abandoning the divide between criminal
183
and civil labels in the deportation context.
In fact, the Court im179

180
181
182
183

Dan Kesselbrenner, writing for the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers
Guild, briefly advanced this argument in an advisory to practitioners regarding the impact of Padilla on habeas claims. Kesselbrenner argues that Padilla did not announce a
new rule of criminal procedure and should thus apply retroactively on habeas review.
However, he argues in the alternative that if Padilla is seen to announce a new rule, practitioners should argue that the rule is “watershed” in nature, and subject to the second
Teague exception. Dan Kesselbrenner, Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers
Guild, A Defending Immigrants Partnership Practice Advisory: Retroactive Applicability of Padilla
v. Kentucky, 2–5 (2011), available at
www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legal
resources/practice_advisories/padilla%20retro%20revised%203-2011.pdf. Kesselbrenner
does, however, admit that this argument may be difficult to make in light of the fact that
other “landmark” decisions like Crawford v. Washington have not been identified as qualifying for “watershed” status.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1482.
Many scholars have likewise recognized the fact that Padilla “broke new ground” in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in a UCLA Law Review article, Professor Daniel Kanstroom referred to Padilla as a “pathbreaking decision” that created a “new constitutional norm.” Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1463,
1472 (2011). See also Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v.
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plicitly recognized the novelty of its position when it acknowledged
that its holding would recognize new grounds for attacking the validi184
ty of a guilty plea. Although the Supreme Court had never applied
the collateral versus direct distinction to define the scope of reasonably effective assistance of counsel, the result in Padilla certainly was
185
not dictated by prior lower court precedent, and at the time Padilla
was decided, its result was certainly in dispute even among members
186
of the nation’s highest court.
In light of the Court’s precedent at
the time Padilla arrived on its docket, it seems relatively clear that Padilla did, in fact, announce a new rule of criminal procedure.
So what, then, is left of the retroactivity question? As outlined
above, many courts have ruled that Padilla cannot apply retroactively
187
in light of the conclusion that Padilla announced a new rule. However, these premises entirely ignore the possibility that Padilla falls
under Teague’s rare watershed exception.
Although courts have repeatedly underscored the extreme rarity
with which Teague’s watershed exception would apply, Padilla is the
188
ideal candidate for “watershed” status, if ever one were to exist. As

184

185

186

187

188

Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 25 CRIM.
JUST. 36, 37 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court broke new ground in holding that a
criminal defense lawyer had failed to provide his noncitizen client competent representation as required by the Sixth Amendment when he did not warn him that he was almost
certain to be deported if he pled guilty.”).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first
applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage, practice has shown
that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than convictions obtained after a trial.” (emphasis added)).
See Chin & Holmes, supra note 36, at 697, 699 (noting that “virtually all jurisdictions”—
including “eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia”—
“hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences
of a conviction,” including deportation).
As was noted by the Chaidez court, the fact “[t]hat the members of the Padilla Court expressed such an ‘array of views’” suggests “that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.”
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1150, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review”); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at
686 (reversing the District Court decision applying Padilla retroactively).
Indeed, many legal scholars have referred to Padilla as a “watershed” decision, without
regard to its retroactivity. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 20, at 1118 (remarking that the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla marked a “watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea” proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1299, 1299, 1332 (2011) (stating that Padilla may “mark[] the beginning of a significant reconceptualization of the nature of deportation,” representing a “critical pivot
point” in the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence); Duncan Fulton, Comment, Emergence of a Deportation Gideon?: The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on Right to Counsel Jurisprudence, 86 TUL. L. REV. 219, 244 (2011) (arguing that Padilla represents a “watershed moment in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence”).
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the parties in Chaidez have argued to the Supreme Court, the question decided in Padilla is one of “exceptional importance” which
189
“go[es] to the core of the legitimacy of criminal convictions.” This
is because, as Justice Stevens noted in the Padilla majority, in light of
changes to current immigration laws, which now make deportation
virtually inevitable in a large number of cases, “accurate legal advice
190
for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.”
Indeed, the majority based its opinion on the fact that “deportation is
an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead
191
guilty to specified crimes.” If armed with the knowledge that a conviction is almost certain to land a defendant in immigration court, a
defendant may very well choose to risk going to trial rather than accept a plea deal offering a reduced sentence. True, many of the
noncitizen defendants who have accepted plea deals have done so
with full knowledge of their own guilt. However, it is also possible
that many innocent individuals have accepted guilty pleas simply because the risk and inconvenience of going to trial were much greater
than the consequences resulting from the given plea deal. Simply
put, information about the deportation consequences of one’s actions may be the most powerful tool available to noncitizens when interacting with the criminal justice system. By depriving a noncitizen
defendant of this powerful tool, the system denies him a constitutional right that stands to have a profound impact on the “fundamental
fairness” of the criminal proceedings against him.
It is thus clear that Padilla’s rule will have a significant impact on
criminal procedure in the immigration context going forward. However, the question remains whether Padilla is sufficiently important to
rise to the level of a “watershed rule of criminal procedure” that warrants retroactivity under Teague. Although courts have yet to extend
this exception to a single case arising on collateral review, federal and
192
state courts exalt the rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright as one
that is deserving of the “watershed” title. In Gideon, the Supreme
Court pronounced that the Sixth Amendment requires that indigent
criminal defendants in all state and federal felony cases be afforded
193
legal representation.
In the majority opinion, Justice Black highlighted that “[r]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in
189
190
191
192
193

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
Id.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 343–45.
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our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
194
truth.”
It is unsurprising that Gideon has been viewed as marking a watershed moment in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and that its magnitude has remained unrivaled in the eyes of the Court for decades.
However, it now seems that Gideon may finally have met its match.
Mere weeks after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla,
immigrants’ rights advocates were referring to Padilla as a “‘Gideon
195
Decision’ for Immigrants,” and academics alluded to Padilla becoming a “deportation Gideon” that could one day come to guarantee the
196
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in deportation proceedings.
One scholar has noted that, in light of Padilla, “[i]t now seems a rather striking irony and possibly a constitutional problem that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel who can explain
and advise as to at least some possible deportation consequences,
while a person arrested for being simply out of status has no such
197
right.” It seems reasonably plausible that in the next several years,
the Supreme Court will announce that its holding in Padilla was intended to resolve that inconsistency.
The language in Padilla supports the notion that fundamental
fairness norms in deportation hearings have significantly expanded
over the years, and that the “bedrock procedural elements” recognized in Gideon should have at least some hold for noncitizens facing
deportation proceedings, whether or not the noncitizen is subject to
deportation due to a criminal conviction. The Court in Padilla
198
deemed deportation to be the “equivalent of banishment or exile”
and acknowledged that a noncitizen’s sense of security in this country
199
Given the
may be one of his most valued intangible possessions.
drastic effects that deportation may have on a noncitizen’s sense of
194
195

196
197
198
199

Id. at 344.
See, e.g., Maria Teresa Rojas, A “Gideon Decision” for Immigrants, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. BLOG
(Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.soros.org/voices/gideon-decision-immigrants (suggesting
that Padilla “completely change[d] the landscape for immigrants facing criminal charges”).
See Fulton, supra note 188, at 244.
Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 319 (2011).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)).
See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (“[D]eportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes
the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.” (emphasis added)).
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security—arguably tantamount to a “basic human need[]” —it is
conceivable that the Court intended to extend the Sixth Amendment
standard announced in Padilla not only to strictly criminal proceedings, but also to deportation proceedings themselves, which now fall
201
somewhere in between the civil and criminal realms.
Padilla carries even greater importance if one interprets the decision to have extended Gideon to all deportation proceedings. Statistics show that representation by counsel may be the single most important factor in predicting success on a noncitizen’s application for
relief during removal proceedings. From fiscal year 2006 through
2010, less than half of the noncitizens whose removal proceedings
202
were completed were represented by legal counsel. In 2007, a representative year, represented detainees in defensive asylum cases received relief in 27% of their cases, while only 8% of those without
203
representation were successful.
In 2009, only 3% of detained, unrepresented asylum-seekers were granted relief, although as many as
204
39% of immigrant detainees had potentially meritorious claims. In
light of these statistics, it is easy to construe the rights recognized in
Padilla as rights that are necessary to prevent an impermissibly large
risk of inaccuracy in the deportation process—a prerequisite for watershed status.
The overlap between Padilla and Gideon is undeniable. As Margaret Love and Gabriel Chin argued in an article in Criminal Justice, “Padilla may turn out to be the most important right to counsel case
205
since Gideon.” It may, thus, be time for courts to put to rest the “Pa-

200

201

202
203

204
205

In 2006, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) unanimously endorsed the establishment
of the right to counsel in civil proceedings where “basic human needs” are at stake. ABA
House of Delegates Res. 112A (Aug. 7, 2006), reprinted in Justice Howard H. Dana, Jr.,
ABA 2006 Resolution on Civil Right to Counsel, 2006 EDWARD V. SPARER SYMPOSIUM: CIVIL
GIDEON: CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501, 507, 508 (2006). Not all states have adopted such a
position, and the Supreme Court has not explicitly embraced this view. Nevertheless, the
ABA resolution suggests a trend toward an expanded perception of the Sixth Amendment that is not a far cry from the view espoused in Padilla.
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (stating that deportation “is not, in a strict sense, a criminal
sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless
intimately related to the criminal process” (internal citation omitted)).
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK G1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT
VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 30
(2008).
See Kanstroom, supra note 183, at 1511–12 (citing statistics reported by the Constitution
Project and the New York City Bar Justice Center).
Love & Chin, supra note 183, at 37.
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dilla is not Gideon” argument, and to finally recognize Padilla as the
first case in history to fall under Teague’s “watershed” exception.
There are, of course, limitations that habeas petitioners will face even
if Padilla is applied retroactively. For example, a large part of the
problem facing immigrants is not their counsel’s inadequacy, but the
substantive immigration law itself. So while Padilla may have marked
a “watershed” moment for noncitizens facing deportation, there will
still be many institutional hurdles to overcome before Padilla’s retro206
activity can take full effect. Further, given the statute of limitations
207
that applies to habeas claims, a number of petitioners may be procedurally barred from applying for habeas relief even after a determination on the issue of retroactivity. Nonetheless, because of the
208
continuing availability of extraordinary relief, Padilla’s retroactivity
remains a hot topic, as the Supreme Court made clear when it granted certiorari in Chaidez this spring. And although the Court’s decision in Chaidez may not address the application of Teague’s exceptions, it is possible that the High Court may one day take it upon itself
to consider Padilla’s “watershed” status.
V. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the rule announced in Padilla has had a
profound impact on Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in the “crim209
migration” context going forward. Padilla has ensured that noncitizen defendants will receive information regarding the immigration
consequences of their tactical decisions, and may even one day guarantee noncitizens the right to counsel in non-criminal deportation
proceedings. The magnitude of Padilla’s holding can be seen in the
sheer number of noncitizens who have sought to benefit from its rule
in the past two years. It is true that as AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations gradually tolls, the number of detainees who may have vi206

207

208

209

See Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1402–03
(2011) (arguing that the content of the substantive criminal law creates just as many
problems for noncitizen defendants as does defense counsel’s inadequacy).
If the Supreme Court recognizes a new constitutional right and permits lower courts to
apply the new right retroactively, § 2255 grants habeas petitioners one year to apply for
habeas relief based on the new constitutional standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (Supp. I
2008).
After the statute of limitations under § 2255 has run out, the federally convicted noncitizen may still have a coram nobis remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act. United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2218–19, 2221–24 (2009).
“Crimmigration” is a term used to define the intersection of criminal and immigration
law. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1705, 1708 (2011).
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able Padilla claims will begin to wane. Nonetheless, acknowledging
Padilla as a new watershed constitutional rule is an important logical
and symbolic step in expanding right-to-counsel jurisprudence in the
immigration arena. The landmark decision in Padilla thus stands to
have an even greater impact if it is recognized to have overcome the
seemingly insurmountable “watershed” exception to Teague’s general
presumption against retroactivity. Indeed, if Padilla does not satisfy
this exception, it is difficult to conceive of a rule that ever would.

